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Abstract
The events of 1997 in Southeast Asia have been largely interpreted as a financial 
crisis, as a momentary problem in an otherwise smoothly operating develop-
ment model. This paper takes issue with this interpretation and argues that in 
fact it indicated the extent of the penetration of globalization in the region and 
threw into stark relief the underlying sociological transformations that have 
accompanied and been created by the developmentalist policies of regional 
states. The paper attempts to indicate what the major sociological issues gen-
erated by the crisis are, to argue for the continuing salience of class analysis 
in interpreting social transformations in contemporary Southeast Asia and to 
propose the elements of a fresh sociological model for examining post-crisis 
Southeast Asian societies encapsulated in a pattern of globalization that is 
having profound but not yet fully mapped cultural and social consequences. 
The paper in other words attempts a sociological interpretation of what has 
been mostly read as an economic problem, and indicates necessary linkages 
between the economic, the sociological and the cultural in the interpretation 
of social change in the region. 
Theorizing 1997
Prior to 1997 the non-socialist societies of Southeast Asia were, with 
the exception of Myanmar (Burma), widely held up as examples of 
the success of 'development' understood in its conventional sense as 
economic growth accompanied by some level of poverty alleviation, 
urbanization and the expansion of infrastructure, both physical (roads, 
bridges, airports) and social (in particular education and medical care). 
Many scholars have argued that, despite the human and ecological costs 
of such development and its disruption of sociological and cultural pat-
terns and more traditional ways of life, on the whole the balance sheet 
is positive and that compared with the experiences of many societies in 
Latin America and Africa, Southeast Asia is a success story (Rigg 1997; 
Maidment and Mackerras 1998). 
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In 1997 however,  began the worst economic crisis in postwar South-
east Asian history. While a number of commentators have examined 
the massive social fallout of this crisis and its political implications in 
terms of what it might say about the states of the region, their real po-
litical autonomy in the world system, local political cultures and the 
possibilities of more genuine democratization (Acharya 1998; Johan-
nen, Rudolph and Gomez 2000), for the most part it has been largely 
interpreted as a failure of regulatory policies and institutions, and to a 
lesser extent of the political systems managing these institutions (Arndt 
and Hall 1999). It has in fact been almost exclusively read and presented 
as a financial crisis, as a technical problem in the smooth running of 
the international capitalist system, and a whole literature has emerged 
presenting the massive economic disarray as a 'problem' of capital and 
exchange markets and as a loss of confidence on the part of interna-
tional investors (Corden 1999), as a problem of weak financial institu-
tions (Jackson 1999) and as a problem of policies (Montes 1998). Most 
of these analyses are themselves written from within the framework of 
assumptions of the very economic system that itself caused the crisis. 
As a result many of these (often virtually instant) analyses are partial 
and theoretically flawed.
This paper will attempt to re-read the 'crisis' and the post-crisis socie-
ties of Southeast Asia from a sociological and theoretical viewpoint in 
an attempt to ask more searching questions about what the 1997 crisis 
'means' when it comes to conceptualizing or reconceptualizing processes 
of social transformation in contemporary Southeast Asia beyond the 
conventional paradigms that have tended to dominate interpretation 
hitherto. The paper in other words is a theoretical one that does not 
purport to add new data, but wishes rather to pose the question of 
the interpretation of the crisis from a sociological rather than from an 
economic angle. Here there are two key issues: what a sociological 
reading of the crisis might look like, and how this might contribute to 
our understanding of patterns of social change in turn of the century 
Southeast Asia on the one hand, and on the other what the study of 
the sociology of Southeast Asian transformations might contribute to 
broader sociological theory, in which Southeast Asia is not seen simply 
as a case study but as the source of input into much wider debates in 
sociology in general and the sociology of development in particular.
The origins of the economic meltdown that began in Thailand and 
spread rapidly throughout the rest of the region with particularly 
dire effects in Indonesia, serious effects in Malaysia and significant 
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but less damaging consequences in Singapore, Brunei and the Philip-
pines, has been attributed to a number of factors. Amongst the longer 
term background factors were weak financial institutions, corruption, 
manipulation of regional economies by local elites (crony capitalism in 
other words), weak fundamentals ('growth' in some cases, as in Japan, 
being attributable to rapidly inflating real estate values, the selling off 
of assets to foreign investors or the export of non-renewable resources, 
rather than to the development of real productive forces) and the ill-
advised restructuring of regional economies along lines dictated by the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, advice which had 
previously done immense damage to the Mexican economy and shortly 
after the Asian crisis led to the virtual collapse of Argentina, another 
hollow economy that had been touted as a Latin American success 
story parallel to that of the 'little dragons' of Southeast and East Asia. 
The immediate cause has been seen as the sudden huge fluctuations in 
capital flows and deliberate currency manipulations of international 
financiers and currency traders. Underlying sociological fundamentals 
have however received little attention. 
In fact the crisis of 1997 and its subsequent social fallout have high-
lighted three major dimensions of the social forces underlying Southeast 
Asia's collective social transformation. The first of these is the depth of 
the penetration of globalization into the regional societies. The exten-
sive theoretical and ideological literature on globalization often fails 
to examine its concrete manifestations in particular places or the full 
range of its effects, which in practice include the sociological and the 
cultural as well as the 'purely' economic, a category that in fact does not 
exist. The full range of these effects however was made starkly visible 
in post-1997 Southeast Asia (Yamashita and Eades 2003). The second 
is the question of the real success of 'development'. After years and in 
some cases decades of high levels of economic growth fuelled by the 
very forces that engineered the subsequent collapse, the crisis demon-
strated the hollowness of development built upon volatile and amoral 
capitalist/globalized foundations and its absolute dependency on those 
foundations. The conventional argument that the crisis wiped out or 
set back a decade at least of development (especially in areas such as 
poverty eradication) is only partly true. The case rather is that this 'de-
velopment' was arguably a chimera that was inherently unsustainable. 
What the crisis demonstrated from a more radical viewpoint was not an 
unfortunate regression, but much more fundamentally the limits of 'de-
velopment' as it has been largely pursued by the developmentalist states 
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of Southeast Asia in the last three decades, and the environmental and 
socio-cultural consequences and uncontrolled transformations promoted 
by this economism based largely on some local varieties of neo-liberal 
thinking combined with the soft authoritarianism so characteristic of 
regional political cultures. The third, and from the perspective of this 
paper the most important, is that Southeast Asian social structures were 
not just 'damaged' by the crisis, but were implicated in it from the begin-
ning, or at least certain class factions were. Those classes (a minority in 
much of the region) that have benefited from the globalized capitalism 
that has certainly transformed their societies have, by pursuing a social 
restructuring that has encouraged consumerism, the motor-car, hyper-
urbanization, individualism, secularization, McDonaldization and the 
Hollywoodization that have undermined local cultural integrity and 
autonomy, created precisely the kinds of social conditions most easily 
shaped by globalized capitalism and hence most vulnerable to its vagar-
ies and its comings and (as the crisis epitomized) goings. 
The question then becomes, what are the sociological aspects of 
Southeast Asian capitalist societies (clearly a different argument would 
be necessary in relation to the socialist or post-socialist states of Vietnam, 
Laos and Cambodia, and for different reasons for Myanmar) that the 
crisis highlights and which are implicated in it? Identifying these has 
substantial implications for development sociology generally. The first 
of these I will argue is class, a notion not widely used in the sociologi-
cal analysis of the ASEAN countries (probably because of its Marxist 
and ideological connotations), although the term 'social stratification' 
is widely used (e.g. Ko 2002). I have recently argued elsewhere (Clam-
mer 2003a) that class is still a salient category of sociological analysis 
in Southeast Asia and that the failure of analysts to name the crisis for 
what it is – a crisis not of but brought about by a fully functioning inter-
national capitalist system – points to the occlusion of this category that 
once again needs to be brought out into the open. In that earlier paper I 
argued both that class is a pervasive structuring factor in contemporary 
Southeast Asian societies, and that it is a paradoxical phenomenon in that 
the very (upper/middle) class factions that are most active in promot-
ing globalization, consumption and civil society are those with least in 
common with those (lower/working) class factions that they purport to 
serve through their involvement in social movements and their desire 
for access to an expanding social infrastructure. Class factions (includ-
ing new ones) are not only generated by and subsequently 'effected' by 
economic transformations, but also actively contribute to them and may 
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indeed even benefit from what is certainly experienced as a crisis by the 
underclass. Other factions however may be badly damaged by the very 
forces to which they have, quite literally, hitched their fortunes, and both 
dimensions of this class impact can be seen as the crisis differentially ef-
fected social categories within the same countries, depending largely on 
their concrete relationship to or dependence on globalization.
The sudden burgeoning of studies of the so-called new middle classes 
almost a decade ago is symptomatic of this (Robison and Goodman 
1996). This class was both a product of and an active promoter of the 
kinds of economic forces that had brought them into being. What those 
piecemeal studies indicated was the need for a more systematic theo-
rizing of the larger context in which such emergent social elements 
appear – that is to say the nexus between class, state, globalization 
and development. While all these terms retain an analytical value, the 
new configurations of the relationships between them post-1997 need 
to be mapped out and related in turn to other new social forces in the 
region (especially religion, new social movements and civil society and 
changing notions of citizenship). When this is done it will be possible to 
return again to these concepts, possibly to redefine them, and certainly 
to rethink their contemporary utility.
But while I am arguing here for the salience of class analysis in un-
derstanding the sociological impact of the crisis and equally importantly 
the differential relationship of different class factions to it, class is not the 
only relevant sociological parameter. It is a good starting point because 
my argument here is that the crisis uncovered actual class alliances and 
interests that had been suppressed in the high growth years preceeding 
the meltdown. This is significant because it shows the hollowness of 
much recent talk in the region of the 'recovery' from the crisis. This talk 
represents an attempt at the normalization of a situation that has in fact 
revealed social divisions and gross inequalities that still exist even though 
they may be once again submerged at the level of discourse. This is also to 
point up once again that this paper is about discourse and the ideological 
constructions of social 'reality', the 1997 crisis being the most revealing 
recent event in Southeast Asia for illuminating this process at work. 
Class analysis also makes it possible to explore new configurations of 
ethnic relations that have been emerging as an aspect of social change 
in the region. The explosion of ethnic or ethno-religious conflict in 
many parts of the region in the immediate past (in Indonesia, southern 
Thailand, Myanmar, the southern Philippines) has complex causes. 
One of the major ones has been the ways in which national govern-
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ments, committed to a statist model of political organization that has 
been one of the outcomes of the institutional convergence promoted 
by globalization and modernity and intensified by the socio-cultural 
normalizing tendencies of capitalism and consumption, have attempted 
to assimilate minorities not only to a common centralized political state, 
but also to an integration into the developmentalist model (Bertrand 
2004; Duncan 2004). In other words, I am suggesting that while many 
regional explanations of ethnic conflict have taken a conventional view 
based on ideas of race and of centre-periphery tensions, the 1997 crisis 
in fact reveals both the extent to which ethnicity and class have become 
entangled and often reflections of each other, and the extent to which 
the de facto pursuit of a common commodified culture and the social 
relations implied by such a culture (the nuclearization of the family, 
monogamy and so forth) has promoted resistance to this homogeni-
zation. This resistance then comes to be reflected through one of the 
only available channels available to many agents, notably ethnicity, 
this being the only socio-political vocabulary available to them. While 
from the actor point of view this is entirely understandable, here I am 
arguing that, from a structural or macroscopic viewpoint, in fact both 
class and ethnicity are encapsulated in a larger and different framework 
of commoditization, and that a fresh sociological language is needed 
regionally to talk about this new configuration implicitly highlighted 
by the events of 1997, although they were clearly existent long before 
the crisis to which they were in fact a contributing factor. 
The relationship between class/ethnicity and the patterns of resist-
ance to and incorporation in the transformations of culture engineered 
by politically led developmentalism that began to emerge in the 1970s 
came to fruition in the 1990s, and were both revealed and implicated 
in the social basis of the events of 1997 (Zawawi 1998). As De Koninck 
persuasively argues, for example, one of the major effects of agricul-
tural modernization in Malaysia has been the displacement of many 
of the rural poor from the productive process altogether, while the 
mechanization of agriculture has in particular marginalized women 
who are increasingly excluded from work and are consequently forced 
into unemployment, or for the younger women into migration to cities 
into domestic labour or factory work in the export-processing zones of 
Penang or even as far afield as Singapore (De Koninck 1992). Combined 
with this kind of major shift in the composition and geography of the 
labour force (and examples can be multiplied for Indonesia and Thai-
land in particular) has been the parallel but mostly ignored growth of 
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consumerism and the radical life-style and cultural changes that this 
has brought about (Chua 2000). These in turn have substantial effects 
on gender relations which of course in turn influence patterns of the 
household consumption, child socialization and subjectivities of all the 
actors involved, many of which no longer fit older anthropological as-
sumptions about the ways in which gender and family relationships are 
structured in Southeast Asia (Stivens 1991; Karim 1995). 
The political/economic structures that had been set in place before the 
crisis and which made it sociologically difficult to resist have had funda-
mentally transformative effects across the region, influencing class, ethnic-
ity, gender, lifestyles, subjectivities, rural-urban relationships, labour-force 
composition and distribution, property relations, spatial patterns and 
rights and freedoms (Scott 1998). Far from being a purely financial crisis, 
the events of 1997 signaled major sociological shifts in Southeast Asia 
that had not been fully noted, pointed up the complicity in the events 
of certain social strata in the region and suggest radical revisions in the 
sociology of development, which is shown to have been asking many of 
the wrong questions as a result of clinging to an outmoded paradigm of 
the forces that shape the social make-up of the region.
Class, State and Crisis
The 1997 crisis was for Southeast Asia the equivalent of the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in Europe almost exactly a decade before. The crisis has 
confounded many of the rosy expectations about the permanent growth 
and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Almost nowhere has it occa-
sioned a rethinking of sociological fundamentals and of the long term 
consequences of continuing to attempt to pursue the same path, except 
amongst many of the regional social movements and a few of the public 
intellectuals associated with them (e.g. Camilleri and Muzaffar 1998), 
whose work tends not to spill over into academic discourse.
 A new road map of contemporary sociological configurations is, 
as suggested above, urgently needed, the outlines of which are futher 
developed below, pointing to the elements of an alternative model. The 
assumptions of economic dynamism and political stability touted by 
many commentators on the region have now to be closely questioned 
and deconstructed. What emerges instead is a sorry picture of weak 
states, many of them with a political culture of either authoritarianism 
and corruption, or both, either unable to devise regulatory mechanisms 
to protect their own people from the worst ravages of globalization, or 
riven by factionalism in which domestic special interest elites were able 
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to prevent the passage of legislation or regulations which would have 
benefited the bulk of their populations when those regulations might 
have damaged the financial interests of those elites (e.g. MacIntyre 1999). 
Moreover, those governments which followed IMF instructions (most 
notably Indonesia) fell even deeper into crisis and recession, suggest-
ing that most regional governments exist for the sake of international 
capitalism and the world order framed by the three dominant interna-
tional pro-globalization bodies – the IMF, World Bank and the WTO 
– rather than for the bulk of their often impoverished populations. The 
class interests of local elites most closely aligned with the world view 
of neo-liberal economics were consistently allowed to take precedence 
over the well being or long term future of the average citizen. The very 
representation of the crisis as a financial one itself indicates how it has 
been constructed drawing attention away from the underlying socio-
logical realities. This representation requires deconstruction before 
any movement towards reconstruction of our understanding of social 
transformations in Southeast Asia.
But before returning to the sociology, a number of background fac-
tors that are deeply implicated in the genesis of the crisis and which 
constitute the frame into which the sociological factors must be fitted 
need to be identified more fully. Firstly, economic globalization turns 
out to mean not only the interdependency of economies linked by fair 
patterns of trade, but also the massive self-interested control exercised 
by international capital and particularly the unrestrained flows of liq-
uid capital and the manipulation of exchange rates, suggesting that the 
analysis of many critics of globalization (e.g. Greider 1997) are essentially 
correct in their view that capitalist economics is now the dominating 
force in the structuring of societies, and that it remakes societies in its 
own image, regardless of the costs in terms of cultural erosion and the 
relentless reconfiguration of what Goran Hyden, speaking of Africa, has 
called 'economies of affection' into economies of greed, consumption, 
profit and competition (Hyden 1980).
Secondly, we see actual if not formal loss of sovereignty on the 
parts of regional governments to economic managers of private foreign 
companies and to the multilateral institutions. While nation-statesare 
certainly not in any immediate danger of disappearing this is not be-
cause they remain powerful, but because they are useful agents of 
globalized capital. The most superficial investigation of any state in 
the region indicates quite clearly that politics now means basically the 
management of the economy and that calls for the recognition of cul-
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ture and values in development are in reality for the most part shunted 
aside in the pursuit of growth (Clammer 1996). The weakness of local 
political, social and cultural integrity in the face of globalization and 
under the banner of 'development' was clearly revealed during and 
after 1997. The state in Southeast Asia has largely become a regulatory 
state with a diminishing agency of its own as it is itself embedded in 
a globalized environment. The state is needed because it promotes or 
protects capital, not because it defends its citizens against the worst 
excesses of capital: it takes on what Immanuel Wallerstein has aptly 
called the 'night watchman' role, a far cry from its once touted func-
tion as the promoter of liberty, equality and fraternity. Amartya Sen's 
(1999) much discussed notion of development as freedom in reality 
takes on a meaning that I doubt that its author intended – the free-
dom to consume, to have one's culture transformed and to see one's 
social structure rearranged. Indeed it has been the transformation 
of Southeast Asian societies in the direction of becoming consumer 
societies that marks one of the most fundamental shifts in socio-cul-
tural organization since the demise of colonialism (Clammer 2003b) 
While regional states may indeed be autonomous vis-à-vis their local 
labour, environmental and other social movements, they are account-
able ultimately not to their electorates, but to international capital 
and the multilaterals. The traditional political science conception of 
sovereignty, frequently invoked by regional states against their critics, 
evidently needs fundamental rethinking in the light of the real world 
that 1997 has so starkly revealed.
 It is evident that the crisis showed the fallacy of basing development 
on foreign-finance-led growth. While the situation varies from country 
to country (with Indonesia being the worse effected) significant increases 
in poverty, malnutrition and unemployment were registered across the 
region. What has not been publicised are the knock-on effects of these 
on gender relations, morale and psychological stability, access to edu-
cational opportunities and the housing market, and purchasing power 
for domestic as well as imported products. While export-oriented com-
panies may have benefited from the sharply declining values of their 
local currencies (Hill 1999: 6) this is  not good news for the rest of the 
population, as other societies such as Mexico and Argentina have also 
found as a result of 'liberalizing' their economies and following IMF 
prescriptions. In such circumstances the urbanization of much of the 
region proves to be a liability, for while agricultural incomes, being less 
exposed to what Hill blandly calls the 'modern financial system', were 
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less effected by the crisis or even benefited from currency depreciations, 
the urban poor were very hard hit and have not recovered.
Unwillingness on the part of economists linked to the World Bank 
to recognize any sociological or political dimensions to the crisis has 
led some such people to argue, quite fantastically, that 'a large nega-
tive shock to confidence and a weak financial sector rather than deep 
fundamental flaws across the crisis economies can explain much of the 
onset of the crisis' (McKibbin 1999: 126). More informed analysis of the 
region, alert to the underlying problematics of mal-development, lack 
of serious attention to poverty alleviation, uncontrolled urbanization 
(itself led by real-estate 'developers'), AIDS, widespread ecological de-
gredation, proletarianization of the work force and the erosion of the 
agricultural sector, has come to radically different conclusions. Indeed 
in the country in which the crisis began (Thailand) all these features of 
'development' and more (including unregulated international tourism) 
were in place as the 'crisis' broke. In fact there was already a crisis, but 
one unnoticed by the international press as it was not a 'financial' one that 
threatened to spread to the rest of Asia and possibly the rest of the world 
(Bello, Cunningham and Li 1998). This silent crisis includes widening 
social inequalities, religious violence, the massive spread of HIV/AIDS, 
uncontrolled urbanization, local resource depletion (including forests 
and natural gas), rising crime, child labour, abuses of human rights, 
serious environmental pollution falling on everybody but especially on 
the poor, cultural erosion, a spreading drug culture and massive shifts 
in gender and other social relationships. This is the real crisis and it 
was there before 1997, was in large part created by the very forces that 
engineered the financial meltdown and will remain unaddressed by the 
post 1997 attempts to return things to 'normal'.
The question must consequently be raised as to what extent colonial-
ism is really over in Southeast Asia and to what extent new forms of 
domination have simply replaced the older forms of direct foreign rule. 
While the case can certainly be made (as it was in outline above) that 
globalization has led to the decline of effective national sovereignty, two 
further points need also to be made. The first is the extent to which the 
nationalism which succeeded formal colonialism was itself in the inter-
ests of the mass of the local populations, or was in fact the replacement 
of foreign elites with domestic ones, which continued in practice many 
of the policies of the colonial era. Nationalism and democratization are 
not synonymous, and the pervasive authoritarianism, militarism and 
corruption of many regional political regimes, combined with indebted-
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ness to the IMF and WB, the encouragement of foreign direct investment 
and often subservience of foreign policy to powerful outside interests 
(the United States in particular) have meant that talk of national 'au-
tonomy' is hollow. 
The second point relates to culture and the extent to which globali-
zation has not only meant the erasure of effective national economic 
autonomy, but also implies the erosion of autonomous local cultures 
and the increasing globalization of social structures, which come to re-
semble each other more and more. The emergence of the 'new middle 
classes' and their common consumption patterns is a prime example of 
this. While the loss of national sovereignty is seen by some as being the 
main problem, I would wish to modify this by arguing firstly that the 
crisis indicates that the nation may not be the best unit to protect and 
enhance the interests of the majority population of a given area, being 
frequently if not always riddled with class and elite interests (something 
thrown into high relief by the crisis) as well as the interests of dominant 
ethnic groups. It is quite easy to buy off the working class for example 
through the expansion of consumption without fundamentally trans-
forming their actual conditions of labour. Secondly, the globalization 
of social structures and cultural practices is as serious a problem as 
economic globalization (Tomlinson 1999). In fact the two are intimately 
linked, as the penetration of consumerism and the spread of what Rob-
ert Heffner and collaborators call 'market cultures' (in which issues of 
morality and society are closely tied to economic transformations in 
the new Asian capitalisms) indicate that forms of capitalist culture 
have become the everyday cultural reality for virtually everybody in 
the region (Heffner 1998). What the crisis has highlighted is the power 
of this nexus and the consequent lack of cultural and sociological re-
sources to withstand the effects of that crisis or to modify the form and 
definition of 'development' that it has created and actively promotes. 
Talk of 'Asian capitalisms', as if they were somehow more benign than 
their Western originating models,  simply obscures the local forms of 
social transformation imposed by the market, intensified by the fact 
that these capitalisms are, in a semi-dependent way, integrated into a 
total world-system the nature and functioning of which they do not and 
cannot determine (Wee 2002). 
The editors of a relatively recent volume of critical essays on Southeast 
Asian development (Dragsbaek-Schmidt, Hersh and Fold 1998: 1), the 
publication of the original 1997 edition of which coincided exactly with 
the timing of the crisis, argue, rightly in my view, that it is misleading 
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to make what they call an 'artificial division between state and market' 
in seeking an accurate analysis of the actual agents of social change in 
Southeast Asia and the emerging structures of unequal distribution of 
social, political and material rewards, in which the class paradigm must 
continue to play an important role as new forms of ('Asian') capitalism 
emerge and as the advanced capitalist economies export more of their 
offshore production to the cheaper labour markets of Southeast Asia. 
In such a context, even though the concept of class itself has become 
somewhat elastic, as Dragsbaek-Schmidt and collaborators argue 'it is 
difficult if not impossible to grasp in any meaningful way the economic 
and social contradictions between strata and social groupings without 
reconsidering the concept of class' (ibid.: 2). This is because as processes 
of production change and economies create wage-labour and a bour-
geoisie, owners and workers, and as labour becomes a commodity, 
so social relations between the elements in a society also change. The 
continuing and indeed intensifying social relations between 'producers 
and appropriators of surplus labour' (ibid.: 2) make class not a less 
salient category in Southeast Asia, but one of increasing significance, 
as I have suggested earlier. With so much attention having been given 
and continuing to be given to ethnicity in Southeast Asia as the major 
category for exploring social differentiation, the crisis strongly suggests 
that we once again direct attention to class, but also to the connections 
between class and ethnicity.
These classes (both old and emergent) are themselves a product of 
the economic transformations of Southeast Asia since 1945. The varie-
ties of local colonialism had of course also introduced new forms of 
stratification into what, it must be remembered, were already highly 
stratified societies. New forms of agricultural practice (plantations and 
agribusinesses) and export-oriented manufacturing, together with the 
subsequent growth of services, bureaucracy and the military made 
possible by the rising surplus, lead naturally to new social categories, 
the interests of which may certainly not be identical and which may 
be further internally segmented and may have very different internal 
cultures and consumption patterns. What the 1997 crisis has highlighted 
is the presence of this social differentiation and the very different corre-
sponding relations to the world system on the part of the different social 
strata, some of whom continue to benefit from it even under conditions 
of crisis and others who have rapidly been devoured by it. Conflicts and 
alliances between these strata that were largely latent pre-1997, when 
a common language of growth and development tended to submerge 
22  The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 20•2004
John Clammer
actual social differences, have become clear as a result of the crisis, as has 
been true in other Asian societies such as Japan with the collapse there 
of the 'bubble economy' that began to deflate around 1996 and might 
even be causally related to the 1997 Southeast Asian collapse. 
Class, then, continues to be a central sociological category for the 
understanding of contemporary Southeast Asian societies. It throws 
into relief both the social differentiation of regional societies and the 
ways in which some of these have been intensified and revealed in stark 
ways by the sociological fallout from the crisis. Externally the South-
east Asian economies are dependent and internally this dependency 
is strengthened by the presence of (middle and capitalist bourgeoisie) 
classes wholly reliant on the continuation of this path and as such 
working in close tandem with the political-bureaucratic strata (McVey 
1992). The result of such elite policy making has been what Dragsbaek-
Schmidt terms 'growth without welfare' (Dragsbaek-Schmidt 1998: 40) 
or what slightly earlier was being termed 'uneven development' (Jomo 
1988). That 'unevenness' has proved to be not merely potholes in the 
road, but the absence of a road at all, or at least of one constructed out 
of sustainable local materials. This requires close engagement with the 
position of commentators such as Jonathan Rigg, who wishes to have 
his cake and eat it by arguing both that development has had 'very 
real failures and inconsistencies' which he lists as 'widening human 
and regional inequalities, severe environmental problems, the exclu-
sion from development of certain groups in society, and cronyism and 
corruption, for example', and that the growth/modernization model 
works (Rigg 1997: 286). This inconsistent position should alert us both 
to the failure of much academic commentary to name the real problems 
and the ideological investment that many scholars who like to pose as 
critical in fact have in the continuation of the very development process 
that produced the crisis in the first place.
Reconceptualizations After the Crisis
Up until this point this essay has been one essentially concerned with 
naming what I would argue is the true nature of the 'crisis': not as a mere 
financial distortion of an otherwise smoothly functioning system, but as a 
crisis of (a) globalization, (b) 'development', (c) regional political systems, 
the inefficiency and class-bias of which has been clearly exposed, and (d) 
sociological convergence or complicity of social strata themselves created 
by the very system that engineered the crisis itself and who are now so 
enmeshed in that system that they are dependent upon it for their own 
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future. But what does this point to? What lessons for sociology in general 
and the sociology of development in particular might be derived from 
this as they might apply to contemporary Southeast Asia? 
Firstly, new forms of Southeast Asian cultural politics are emerging 
from the recognition that even local cultures are connected to the glo-
bal. This can lead to new conceptions of citizenship, which, while no 
doubt still rooted in the individual nation-states, come to take on both 
a regional and a global aspect as well. While 'culture and development' 
theorists (e.g. Schech and Haggis 2000) have argued that culture needs 
to be put back into the (economistic) understanding of development, the 
stronger thesis is being advanced here that culture is development. The 
crisis has highlighted the theoretical poverty of a conception of develop-
ment built on purely economistic assumptions that turn out to erode 
or destroy the very cultures of the people who are supposed to benefit 
from that development. Even the provision of schools and healthcare 
is of little meaning if the real intention is to turn children into middle 
class consumers and to keep their bodies fit for capitalist labour and 
military service. Some commentators who have argued, rightly I think, 
for the centrality of cultural analysis in the understanding of Southeast 
Asian societies (e.g. Kahn 1998a) have gone as far as to suggest that in 
reality Southeast Asia is in a post-nationalist phase, not only because of 
the effects of economic globalization, but also because of (a) the cultural 
and political linkages that now tie the regional societies to each other 
and to international civil society organizations, social movements and 
religions, (b) the widespread access to information technology and (c) 
the increasingly common language of human rights. By focusing atten-
tion on financial concerns the crisis has been constructed in exceedingly 
narrow terms when in fact it involves not only states, but supra-state 
actors (international capital and the multilateral institutions that protect 
its interests in the guise of promoting development and fair trade and 
which have as a consequence profound sociological effects), and sub-
national actors (actual local cultures). What links them is the ways in 
which identities are constructed and reconstructed not any longer out 
of indigenous local soils, but out of the forces of globalized capitalism 
that are now the major and almost only source of 'culture' (Reynolds 
1998), despite the attempts of regional social movements and NGOs, 
religious leaders and intellectuals to redefine socio-cultural reality in 
more nativist terms (Sulak 1985).
Secondly, to focus only on the 'effects' of the crisis is to normalize 
its true nature and the conditions which allowed it to occur. To do this 
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is not only to fail to name the actual factors involved, but is also the 
failure to understand the underlying social conditions – the remaking 
and transformation of regional societies in forms that far exceed the 
wildest excesses of colonialism and is ultimately far less beneficial. The 
crisis has been constructed in a certain way, and consequently needs 
systematic deconstruction.
Thirdly, an attractive way of looking at indigenous resources for so-
cial change is to turn to the 'new social movements' in the region. But as 
Dragsbaek-Schmidt (1998: 11) points out, the tendency is to locate these 
within the sphere of 'civil society' rather than of property relations. In fact, 
as was noted above, civil society in the region is closely linked to class 
structures and many civil society organizations are the middle classes or-
ganizing to defend their own interests rather than intending to transform 
their societies. A culturalist emphasis on cultural differentiation (and 
Southeast Asian Studies has a whole vocabulary for this – plural socie-
ties, multiracialism, 'Instant Asia', 'Malaysia, Truly Asia', unity within 
diversity), while rightly identifying the cultural diversity and richness 
of the region, fails to make the connection between culture and class and 
the systemic inequalities that the notion of culture can hide (Kahn 1998b). 
This is not of course to deny the centrality of culture in class analysis 
(which this paper is in part intended to restore) or to argue (as Jonathan 
Rigg does for example) that the new social movements are not important 
vehicles for social change and for the generation of new thinking about 
development and values. Rather it is to argue for a new conception of 
what used to be called political economy in which the economic and the 
social are analysed together and in their mutual interconnections in a 
holistic model of social processes and of global-local ones.
As James Goodman has argued at length (Goodman 2003), the shifting 
impact of neo-liberal globalism has radically altered what he terms the 
'mobilization framework' of social movements in Southeast Asia. The 
weakening of the national development projects of the past decades, new 
or sharper sub-national or cross national inequalities,  and an altered 
international environment in which transnational capitalism, multilat-
eral institutions and globalization are the key factors or actors, have 
changed the environment of social mobilization movements throughout 
the region. The  collapse of socialism in all but name in Indochina has 
similarly contributed to  new regional configurations. What 1997 has 
sharply revealed however is the massive disruption of developmental-
ism and of the forms of political legitimacy that regional governments 
attempted to generate for themselves by the single-minded pursuit of 
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that agenda. While the destabilization that the crisis revealed (rather 
than created) has changed the basis of mobilization for older style 
social movements, it has of course also created new openings. 'Crises 
delegitimize the status quo, destabilize elite patronage and politicize 
social life' (Goodman 2003; 34) and potentially at least create a new 
'democratic moment' (Acharya 1998) in the political cultures of the 
regional societies. But even Goodman in his analysis of the impacts of 
neo-liberal globalization on Southeast Asia persists is seeing the 1997 
crisis as a financial one, even though his own argument points to much 
wider implications and causes, the deepening inequalities that are the 
focus of his essay being the main symptoms of this. It is precisely to 
cover up this underlying truth that so much effort has been expended 
on constructing the 1997 crisis as a financial one. The real crisis is far 
wider, deeper and more fundamental, but the recognition of this would 
of course force some equally fundamental political and policy changes 
that are profoundly unpalatable to the governments of the region, the 
multilaterals and the corporate interests which themselves are driving 
the globalization that is at the root of the crisis. 
 The crisis has of course had its 'effects' – on poverty alleviation, 
employment, housing, education, provision of health care and gender 
relations. These effects, however, while they have certainly damaged 
the new middle classes as the stratum most closely identified with the 
dependent development that has created the crisis, have fallen most 
heavily on the already disadvantaged and on the poor in particular. The 
construction of the crisis as essentially a financial problem pointing up 
the weakness of regulatory regimes in Southeast Asia has entirely missed 
this point. It has also failed to take into account the long term sustain-
ability of the dependent development that the region's governments are 
committed to – in particular environmental impact, resource depletion 
and long term energy issues. In their rush to build new airports or to 
add new terminals to already half empty ones, governments appear to 
be paying little attention (although the West's incursions into Iraq may 
suggest another interpretation) to the well-documented expectations 
that known oil reserves will be largely exhausted by 2030 (Mason 2003; 
Rifkin 2003). It may well be that the history of the region will ensure 
that the poor and marginalized will get their revenge and that within 
many of our lifetimes it may be the peasants and hunter-gatherers of 
Southeast Asia's forests who (re)inherit the earth.
 What has happened in the region has been fast capitalist economic 
growth outstripping the development of political institutions and 
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processes. Authoritarianism, weak democratic institutions, electoral 
manipulation, corruption, controlled media, a dependent judiciary 
and an underdeveloped civil society (Johannen, Rudolph and Gomez 
2000: 8) have provided exactly the conditions for the penetration of 
unrestrained capitalism, have excluded the articulation of political and 
social alternatives and have fundamentally weakened the ability of in-
dividual nation-state actors in the region to respond to the pressures of 
globalization, even if they wanted to. So far I entirely agree (that one 
major and neglected factor in the genesis of the crisis is governance) 
but where I depart from this analysis is the assumption that existing 
capitalism is the only system available to the societies of Southeast Asia, 
or as Rudolph puts it 'successful market economies require political 
freedom to provide a barrier against economic cronyism and other anti 
competitive and inefficient practices' (ibid.: 13). For here we have a 
critique that shares the basic assumptions of the engineers of the crisis: 
that globalized marketization is inevitable and all that can be done is to 
improve its working to make it more 'efficient'. In fact there are more 
moderate positions between slavish acceptance of 'free' market capital-
ism and the outright rejection of globalization, for example the thesis 
of George Monbiot that the challenge is not to overthrow globalization 
but precisely to capture it for democratic, egalitarian and genuinely 
internationalist progressivism that would allow and indeed encourage 
international cooperation and the huge benefits of access to one anoth-
er's cultures while avoiding the equally huge damaging effects of the 
capitalist/IMF version (Monbiot 2003).
Southeast Asia After 'Modernity'
Let me conclude by recapitulating my main thesis and briefly sug-
gesting where it points in terms of future analysis and action. I have 
argued essentially that the 1997 crisis has largely been constructed as 
a financial problem, caused by weak regulatory bodies and regional 
governments and to be solved or prevented from happening again by 
more and stronger regulations, largely imposed from the outside by 
the IMF. I have suggested that this analysis is fundamentally wrong 
and theoretically impoverished, not least because it ignores the so-
ciological factors at work throughout the region that have silently 
transformed Southeast Asia into one of the foremost areas of the world 
in which capitalist production relations and their social and cultural 
consequences have been given the freest rein under the labels of de-
velopmentalism and modernization.  Accordingly I have advanced 
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the argument that the crisis is an outcome of both globalization and 
a false conception of development and represents a profound form 
of neo-colonialism masquerading as modernity, a point developed at 
length by Zygmunt Bauman (1999), who has argued that in the West 
the outcome of modernity was not emancipation, but the Holocaust; 
in Southeast Asia the outcome has been 1997. Underlying and largely 
concealed by this globalization have been new social patterns that 
have emerged in Southeast Asia in the past three decades or so, many 
of which have not been fully mapped or identified, but which I have 
argued provided the social context in which a crisis could so easily 
erupt. The real nature of this historical process can be seen not only 
in its ecological unsustainability, but sociologically in its effects on 
class formation and social differentiation, and its remaking of regional 
cultures as consumer cultures which are, by virtue of becoming part 
of the 'inside' of global capitalism, unable to resist that globalization 
or in extreme cases even to conceptualize alternatives to the 'reality' 
in which they find themselves.
This has a number of implications for the analysis of Southeast Asian 
societies. Firstly, while by no means unimportant, social movements and 
civil society organizations can have little fundamental effect on posi-
tive social transformation unless they are both aware of and can detach 
themselves at least to some degree from this hegemonic discourse and 
practice. Secondly, while the examination of culture is equally important, 
it cannot be separated from class analysis, the generation and expression 
of culture being itself in part a function of class position as Pierre Bourdieu 
has demonstrated for European societies (Bourdieu 1984). Thirdly, a more 
accurate understanding of the fundamental nature of the crisis allows 
engagement with many of the ideological obfuscations that  in the past 
have clouded the determination of the actual relationships between rapid 
capitalist-led economic growth, authoritarian government and lack of 
deep democratization, such as the so-called 'Asian Values' debates and 
their connection with limited support for human rights and suppression 
of a free media (Jacobsen and Bruun 2000), and fundamental sociological 
shifts, often unnoticed for some time because of the persistence of older 
categories of social analysis such as the use of plural society models and 
the privileging of ethnicity over class. An accurate understanding of the 
nature of the crisis permits constructive debate on alternative futures, 
other conceptions of development and relationships between peoples and 
governments. As David Harvey has so cogently argued, contemporary 
globalization and the deeply unequal geographical development that it 
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has promoted – a whole geography of inequality –  have historical roots 
and hence are contingent not necessary (Harvey 2000). 
Furthermore, deeply implicated in patterns of economic change are 
the parallel changes in culture, subjectivities, morality and identity that 
accompany the transformations that Southeast Asia has experienced 
in the last three decades. If in modern history colonialism was the first 
such seismic shift and decolonization the second, it has undoubtedly 
been the absorbtion of the region into the international capitalist system 
that has been the third. Many of the socio-cultural effects of this were 
occluded until the 1997 crisis threw them into stark relief and called 
into question the whole notion of 'miracle economies', so celebrated by 
the adherents of neo-liberalism and the Washington Consensus (Jomo 
2003). If the crisis is simply normalized and business-as-usual continues, 
the lessons of 1997 will not have been learnt and the next Asian crisis 
will be even bigger and less manageable. Its positive effects if correctly 
read will be to lead to the development of a new paradigm for Southeast 
Asian Studies. This paradigm (a) will bring together the analysis of the 
economic and the social, (b) will be alert to the quiet but fundamental 
shifts in sociology and subjectivity and the subtle cultural expressions of 
class that have accompanied economic transformations, (c) will situate 
Southeast Asia within the larger framework of globalization, and (d) 
will build on the possible gains of the crisis. These can be (a) a strength-
ened labour movement and movements for increased democratic and 
electoral participation and the corresponding visibility of arguments for 
human and environmentally responsible development (Malhotra 2002), 
(b) the weakening of developmental authoritarianism as its credibility 
has collapsed, and (c) the resisting of issues of values at the centre of 
debates about the meaning of development in a region where religious 
affiliation and commitment to traditional forms still remains strong. 
Cultural conflicts will then appear as what they often are  –  the outcome 
of unresolvable tensions between the culture of the state and the culture 
of the as yet half-digested culture of the market and of consumption, 
expressed in the language of ethnicity, but in fact the leading symptom 
of the vast socio-cultural shifts that Southeast Asia has experienced in 
its recent postcolonial history and of which the crisis of 1997 was the 
most dramatic, but by no means the last, expression.
John Clammer is Professor of Comparative Sociology and Asian Studies at Sophia 
University, Tokyo.
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